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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
CONRAD W. PETERSEN, ) 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 39643 
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2011-4470 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Conrad W. Petersen asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Opinion No. 775 (Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which reversed the district court's order granting 
Mr. Petersen's motion to suppress, was in conflict with previous decisions of this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court, as well as with its own precedent, in that it 
authorized a warrantless search based on what the officer admitted to be an 
unparticularized suspicion. 
1 
Assuming review is granted, Mr. Petersen requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's order suppressing the evidence found in the passenger compartment of 
his car as fruit of an illegal search. Mr. Petersen claims that the district court's order 
can be affirmed on two different bases: first, as the district court determined, the 
officers did not have probable cause to search the passenger compartment; and 
second, the officers impermissibly extended the traffic stop. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Petersen was driving through northern Idaho on 1-90, heading toward Seattle, 
where he intended to visit a friend and potentially purchase a motor home. (R., p.203.) 
He had recently purchased his car in Montana and was displaying the appropriate 
temporary registration from the rear of his vehicle, as required by Montana law. 
(R., pp.206-07.) Officer Joel Gorham and Officer Jerry Moffett were working an 
"interdiction" patrol along Mr. Petersen's route, meaning they were stopping vehicles on 
the interstate, just "looking for criminals." (Tr., Vol.2, p.32, Ls.3-14.) 1 When 
Mr. Petersen drove past them, they noticed he was not displaying a front license plate, 
and so decided to pull him over. (Tr., Vol.1, p.4, Ls.9-20.) 
While the officers were still 120 yards behind Mr. Petersen, and based on what 
they admitted was a "pretty rudimentary" observation and calculation, they saw what 
they described as an improper signal and an unsafe merge as Mr. Petersen passed a 
1 The transcripts in this case were provided in two separate electronic PDF files. 
To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the file containing the transcript from the 
preliminary hearing, which was provided in the electronic file "Exhibits." "Vol.2" will refer 
to the transcript from the hearing of Mr. Petersen's motions to suppress and dismiss, 
which was provided in the electronic file "09-15-11 Motion, 11-19-11 Motion, 12-22-11 
Motion." Page references in both cases will refer to the number appearing on the 
transcript page, rather than the PDF page designation. 
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semi-truck. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.14 - p.16, L.5.) The officers activated their emergency 
lights in order to pull Mr. Petersen over. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.3-8.) As they approached 
Mr. Petersen's car, they were able to see the temporary Montana registration, which 
was visible from a safe following distance.2 (Tr., Vol.2, p.35, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Petersen 
yielded appropriately, although he was close enough to the right lane of travel so as to 
concern Officer Gorham with the safety of approaching the vehicle on the driver's side. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.5-9 (Officer Gorham testifying that Mr. Petersen had stopped 
"sufficiently on the shoulder of the road"); Tr., Vol.2, p.60, L.22 - p.61, L.5 (Officer 
Gorham discussing his safety concern with the position of Mr. Peterson's vehicle 
vis-a-vis the right lane of travel).) The officers left the emergency lights on their vehicle 
activated throughoutthe duration of the stop. (R., p.217.) 
Officer Gorham asked Mr. Petersen for his license and registration, which 
Mr. Petersen provided. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.11-14.) The officer saw the following items 
in Mr. Petersen's car: a partially-empty twelve pack of Diet Pepsi, an air freshener, two 
cellular phones, a pair of jeans, and some miscellaneous documents. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, 
Ls.14-20; Tr., Vol.2, p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.17.) He described the car as "very clean." 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.22, L.25.) Mr. Petersen was very friendly, though his hands were shaking. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.17-18; Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.6-8.) Officer Gorham took Mr. Petersen's 
identification back to the police vehicle and gave them to Officer Moffett, so Officer 
Moffett could perform a records check while Officer Gorham got the citation book and 
2 The district court ultimately found that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to 
stop Mr. Petersen based on the lack of a front license plate because Mr. Petersen's use 
of a temporary registration on the rear of his car comported with Montana law. 
(R., pp.206-07.) However, it did find that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the 
stop from the observations regarding the allegedly-improper signal and merge. 
{R., pp.207-09.) 
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returned to Mr. Petersen's car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.22-25.) Officer Gorham had 
decided to issue Mr. Petersen a "warning citation," which meant he had decided not to 
cite Mr. Petersen for any violation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.41, Ls.10-13.) 
While he was writing the warning, Officer Gorham had Mr. Petersen get out of his 
car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.24-25.) In speaking with Mr. Petersen, Officer Gorham learned 
that Mr. Petersen was going to Seattle to visit a friend. (Tr., Vol.1, p.26, L.24 - p.27, 
L.1.) This information was apparently suspicious to the officer. (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, 
Ls.14-16.) The reason for this, according to Officer Gorham, is that Seattle is "a major 
distributor of marijuana" but cities like Boston, New York City, Minneapolis, and 
Anchorage are not.3 (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.17 - p.28, L.18.) Officer Moffett walked up and 
told Officer Gorham that the records check had not revealed any reason to arrest 
Mr. Petersen, and he returned Mr. Petersen's license and registration. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, 
Ls.7-10.) Officer Gorham gave Mr. Petersen the written warning and asked 
Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go."4 (Tr., Vol.2, p.70, L.24 - p.71, L.2; R., p.20.) 
Mr. Petersen indicated that he was. (R., p.20; Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.15-16.) As a result, 
Mr. Petersen shook both officers' hands and turned to leave. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, 
Ls.10-12.) 
3 This apparently means, according to Officer Gorham, that all vehicles headed to or 
from Seattle are suspected to be involved in marijuana trafficking simply because 
Seattle is involved in their travel plans. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.17 - p.29, L.5.) 
4 Officer Gorham offered conflicting testimony as to whether he asked Mr. Petersen if he 
was "good to go" or whether he told Mr. Petersen that he was "good to go." (Compare 
Tr., vol.2, p.70, L.24 - p.71, L.2; and R., p.20 (police report indicating Officer Gorham 
asked Mr. Petersen if he was good to go); with Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) The district court 
resolved this contradiction, finding, as a matter of fact, that Officer Gorham "asked 
Defendant if he was 'good to go."' (R., p.202 (emphasis added).) 
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However, Officer Gorham decided that he was not done with his investigation 
and, a few seconds later, as Mr. Petersen was walking back to his car, reinitiated the 
conversation with Mr. Petersen so as to ask Mr. Petersen more questions. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.50, L.25 - p.51, L.9 (Officer Gorham admitting that he was continuing his 
investigation); Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.5-11 (Officer Gorham testifying as to the time between 
his asking Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go" and his extension of the detention).)5 
Officer Gorham also admitted that he was not investigating any crime in particular. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4.) Specifically, Officer Gorham testified that: "I asked 
[Mr. Petersen] if he was good to go, in which [sic] he told me he was." (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, 
Ls.15-16.) That was consistent with his police report. (R., p.20.) Additionally, Officer 
Gorham testified that he was trying to engage in a consensual conversation specifically 
to extend the detention without violating the rules about impermissibly extending a 
detention. (Tr., Vol.2, p.49, L.9 - p.50, L.2.) Officer Gorham first asked Mr. Petersen 
about his travel plans to see if he could get Mr. Petersen to make an inconsistent 
statement, and then asked if he could search the trunk of Mr. Petersen's car. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.34, Ls.3-9; Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.25.) Mr. Petersen opened the 
trunk for Officer Gorham.6 (Tr., Vol.2, p.26, Ls.1-3.) 
5 Despite being part of a special task force designed to locate evidence of major crimes, 
the officers' vehicle is not equipped with audio or video recording devices. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.44, Ls.5-8.) Therefore, the only record of what Officer Gorham said and how he said 
it is the transcript of his testimony. 
6 The district court ultimately found that Mr. Petersen had engaged in a consensual 
conversation, and therefore, the stop was not illegally extended. (See R., pp.212-17.) 
However, it did note that, if the conversation had not been consensual, the officers 
would have illegally extended the stop. (R., pp.211-12.) It also found that Mr. Petersen 
had voluntarily consented to the search of his trunk. (R., pp.210-17.) Additionally, the 
district court determined that the consent to search the trunk implicitly included consent 
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Inside the trunk, Officer Gorham found an average-sized duffle bag, which 
Mr. Petersen said contained $55,000 in cash.7 (Tr., Vol.2, p.26, Ls.7-25.) The money 
was separated into thousand dollar bundles, with one of the bills and a rubber band 
used to secure the bundles.8 (Tr., Vol.2, p.27, Ls.12-16.) Upon seeing the money and 
without requesting consent, Officer Moffett began searching the passenger 
compartment of Mr. Petersen's vehicle.9 (See Tr., Vol.2, p.42, Ls.6-11.) While Officer 
Moffett began his search, Officer Gorham asked Mr. Petersen various questions about 
the money. (Tr., Vol.2, p.42, Ls.6-11.) Inside the passenger compartment, Officer 
Moffett found a small quantity of marijuana as well as some literature about certain 
gardening techniques (specifically, hydroponics), receipts for gardening materials, and 
documents relating to the sale and registration of the car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.96, Ls.12-19; 
R., pp.36-40.) Mr. Petersen was placed under arrest for possession of marijuana. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.70, Ls.6-8.) 
Mr. Petersen was ultimately charged with four different offenses: money 
laundering, attempted destruction of evidence, misdemeanor possession of marijuana, 
and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia. (R., pp.86-88.) In regard to 
the money laundering charge, the State initially alleged several alternative means by 
to search all containers therein, absent any indication to the contrary by Mr. Petersen. 
~R., p.217.) 
When the cash was subsequently counted, it actually totaled approximately 
$71,505.00. (R., p.18.) Mr. Petersen had an additional $890.00 in cash on his person. 
~R., p.18; Tr., Vol.1, p.52, Ls.21-25.) 
Officer Gorham testified that he encounters people carrying thousands of dollars in 
cash "all the time" and those other people did not secure their money in this particular 
fashion. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.17-20.) Rather, Officer Gorham testified that this was 
more consistent with money carried by people involved in narcotics trafficking. (See 
Tr., Vol.2, p.79, Ls.5-24.) 
9 Officer Gorham admitted that Mr. Petersen was never asked for his consent to search 
any part of the vehicle except the trunk. (Tr., Vol.2, p.52, L.20 - p.53, L.7.) 
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which Mr. Petersen committed that offense. (See R., pp.81-82.) However, the 
magistrate court only bound Mr. Petersen over on a single theory. (Tr., Vol.1, p.104, 
Ls.5-23; see also R., pp.220-21.) Specifically, it found probable cause to believe 
Mr. Petersen had violated I.C. § 18-8201(1) by transporting money he knew was used 
to further a pattern of racketeering, and that pattern of racketeering was evidenced by 
violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 10 (Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.5-23; see also 
R., pp.220-21.) 
Mr. Petersen filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his car as the fruit 
of an illegal search, and a motion to dismiss the information as unsupported by probable 
cause. (R., pp.98-99, 131-48.) As to the motion to suppress, Mr. Petersen alleged 
several reasons why the officers' search was illegal: they did not have reasonable 
suspicion to pull him over, they impermissibly extended the detention, the consent to 
search the trunk was not voluntarily given, the search exceeded the scope of 
the consent, and there was no probable cause to justify a warrantless search. 
(R., pp.106-29, 196-97.) In regard to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Petersen challenged 
the money laundering charge as being overbroad and unspecific in its allegations, 
noting that it did not allege a specific act (much less the two specific acts required by 
the money laundering statute) by which Mr. Petersen had violated chapter 27, title 37, 
Idaho Code, in a pattern of racketeering, and thereby committed the offense of money 
laundering. (R., p.135.) Alternatively, he argued that even if such acts were alleged, no 
such acts were alleged to have occurred in Idaho and, therefore, there was no proof on 
a material element of the offense, requiring dismissal of the charge. (R., pp.136-39.) 
1° Chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, is the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 
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The district court held a hearing on Mr. Petersen's motions. The prosecutor 
made no arguments on the record at the hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) While 
there was a subsequent brief filed by the defendant, no brief from the State appears in 
the record in that regard. 11 (R., pp.191-98; see generally R.) 
The district court ultimately concluded that the items in the passenger 
compartment of Mr. Petersen's car which were observed by Officer Gorham did not 
support a particularized suspicion of anything, but rather, merely gave rise to a hunch. 
(R., p.211.) Therefore, even when considered with the cash found in the trunk of the 
car, the district court found they did not amount to probable cause in the totality of the 
circumstances to search the passenger compartment. (R., pp.218-19.) Additionally, it 
found that the scope of Mr. Petersen's consent did not extend to the passenger 
compartment. (R., p.219.) Therefore, the district court suppressed all the evidence 
found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle (i.e., the marijuana, the 
paraphernalia, and the documents) as the fruit of an illegal, warrantless search. 
(R., p.219.) 
In regard to the motion to dismiss, the district court found that Mr. Petersen had 
only been bound over on the theory that he had committed money laundering by 
transporting money he knew to be related to a pattern of racketeering evidenced by 
violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. (R., pp.220-21.) The district court also 
found that the Information impermissibly alleged alternative means of committing the 
11 In fact, the only brief from the State which does appear in the record addresses 
Mr. Petersen's subsequent arguments on the attempted destruction of evidence 
charge. (R., pp.253-57.) The State made no arguments on appeal in that regard. (See 
generally App. Br.) 
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offense for which Mr. Petersen was not bound over. (R., pp.220-21.) Therefore, it 
struck those portions of the Information which were improperly alleged. (R., p.221.) 
As to the theory under which Mr. Petersen had been bound over, the district 
court found that the information sufficiently alleged a factual basis for the offense so that 
Mr. Petersen was properly put on notice. (R., pp.222-23.) However, it found that no 
evidence had been proffered by the State as to one of the material elements of that 
offense - that Mr. Petersen knew or intended the money to be used to further a pattern 
of racketeering, evidenced by violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 
(R., pp.224-25.) Specifically, the district court noted that the State did not allege any 
acts occurring in Idaho which demonstrated such a pattern of violations of chapter 27, 
title 37. (See R., p.224.) The closest the State had come to meeting that burden was 
speculating that Mr. Petersen might, at some point in the future, use that money to 
purchase a controlled substance and then might possibly return to Idaho, thereby 
potentially violating chapter 27, title 37 Idaho Code. That, the district court held, was 
insufficient to meet the State's burden. (R., p.224.) Therefore, because the State had 
failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Mr. Petersen had committed 
money laundering, the district court dismissed that charge. (R., pp.224-25.) 
The State appealed from the order suppressing the evidence from the passenger 
compartment and the order dismissing the money laundering charge, challenging the 
district court's conclusions on both issues. (Order Granting Motion to Augment the 
Record, dated June 3, 2013 (augmenting the record with a copy of the notice of 
appeal).) Specifically, it challenged the district court's determination that there was no 
probable cause to justify the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of 
9 
Mr. Petersen's car pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 12 
(App. Br., pp.5-9.) It also challenged the district court's finding that there was no 
probable cause showing made in regard to all the material elements of the money 
laundering charge, and so challenged the district court's dismissal of that charge. 
(App. Br., pp.9-13.) The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, 
conceding that its challenge to the decision to dismiss the money laundering charge 
was not filed from an appealable order. (Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Statement in 
Support Thereof, dated October 16, 2013.) This Court granted that motion on the basis 
that it "appears that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction as to that issue" and 
dismissed the appellate challenge as to the order dismissing the money laundering 
charge. (Order Dismissing Appeal In Part, dated October 22, 2013.) 
Mr. Petersen's response to the remaining issue was two-fold. First, he argued 
that the district court's decision to suppress the evidence found in the passenger 
compartment was correct because officers did not possess, by their own admission, the 
necessary particularized suspicion to engage in the warrantless search of the 
passenger compartment. (Resp. Br., pp.15-20.) He also argued, in the alternative, the 
appellate court could affirm that decision under the rationale of "right result, wrong 
reason" because the officers illegally prolonged the traffic stop.13 (Resp. Br., pp.20-27.) 
12 In making this argument, the State presumed that the search of the trunk was valid 
and the money found therein could be considered in the probable cause determination. 
(App. Br., pp.5-9.) As will be explained infra, Mr. Petersen does not believe that is the 
case. 
13 That issue had been litigated as part of the suppression motion, and the district court 
had determined that the officers did not illegally prolong the stop. As such, 
Mr. Petersen contended that the district court's conclusion in that regard was erroneous, 
but that the appellate court could still affirm its ultimate conclusion in that regard. 
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The Court of Appeals agreed that none of the facts upon which the officers relied 
to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle were criminal in nature. (Opinion, 
p.9.) Nevertheless, it reversed the district court's decision based on its determination 
that all the facts together still "provided a substantial chance or probability that a search 
of [Mr.] Petersen's vehicle would yield evidence of criminal activity involving cash or 
drugs." (Opinion, p.9.) Mr. Petersen filed a timely petition for review following the 
issuance of that opinion. 
11 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Petersen's Judgment 
of Conviction is in conflict with previous decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals, in that the 
decision allows a warrantless search based on an unparticularized suspicion. 
2. Whether the district court's order suppressing the evidence should be affirmed 
because the officers engaged in an illegal search of Mr. Petersen's car. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Petersen's Judgment Of Conviction 
Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court, The Idaho 
Supreme Court, And The Idaho Court Of Appeals, In That The Decision Allows A 
Warrantless Search Based On An Unparticularized Suspicion 
A Introduction 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted 
only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered. 
Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be considered in 
evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and, 
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 11 S(b). In this case, Mr. Petersen contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted because the Court of Appeals' decision is in 
contravention of United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho Court 
13 
of Appeals precedent. I.A.R. 118(b)(2)-(3). Therefore, this Court should exercise its 
review authority in this case. 
B. The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Improperly Allows Warrantless Searches Based 
On An Officer's Hunch 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135 
Idaho 469, 471 (2001). 
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a 
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment. The State can only 
overcome that presumption by demonstrating that one of the exceptional, well-
established, and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable to 
the facts. Id. at 390-91; see a/so State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding 
the same standard applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution). 
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile 
exception, which allows police officers to search a vehicle when they have "probable 
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime." 
State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012); see a/so United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798, 805 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
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According to this Court, probable cause is established "when the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise-in the 
mind of a reasonable person-to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime would be found in a particular place." Id. Probable cause does not arise when 
the officer possesses only a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion of criminal activity. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59 (Ct. App. 
2011). In order to be a "particularized" suspicion, the officer's suspicion must satisfy 
two elements: (1) it must be based on the totality of the circumstances, and (2) it must 
yield a reasonable suspicion that the particular person is engaged in a criminal activity. 
State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). Specificity in this regard is a core 
requirement of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18; United 
States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411,418 (1981). As such, where there is a lack of evidence 
to show any specific criminal activity (i.e., where "the evidence available to the officers 
prior to the unlawful search did not implicate any specific criminal activity"), the officers 
do not have a particularized suspicion. State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 600 
(Ct. App. 2010) (interpreting State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 (Ct. App. 2006)) 
(emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case ignores the requirement that the 
suspicion be particularized in order to amount to probable cause. Just as the officers 
conceded that they did not know what criminal activity they were investigating, 14 the 
14 Q. What crime did you reasonably suppose he was engaged in? 
A. I'm not sure. That's why I asked for consent to search the vehicle to 
find possible evidence of that crime. And criminal indicators could be any 
crime throughout the spectrum. People are going to show indicators, 
15 
Court of Appeals' opinion could not say what particular criminal activity these factors 
indicated: the evidence "provided a substantial chance or probability that a search of 
[Mr.] Petersen's vehicle would yield evidence of criminal activity involving cash or 
drugs." (Opinion, p.9 (emphasis added).) That decision does not hold the State to its 
burden to show there was evidence of specific criminal activity, a requirement that has 
been established and repeatedly upheld by the United States Supreme Court, this 
Court, and the Court of Appeals itself. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; Anderson, 154 Idaho at 
706; Newman, 149 Idaho at 600; Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64; Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915. 
This Opinion allows a warrantless search in a scenario which constitutes the definition 
of a hunch: the officer, looking at facts which even the Court of Appeals admits were 
not criminal in nature, had a hunch Mr. Petersen might be engaged in some sort of 
unspecified criminal activity. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
In fact, when considering a case with similar facts, all of which, independently, 
did not have a suspicious nature, the Court of Appeals had held "[t]hese facts alone, 
although they could be viewed in a suspicious light, do not support a commonsense 
evaluation that there was a fair probability that contraband existed in the home. To the 
whether they are murderers, whether they had child porn inside the 
vehicle, drugs, money. Who knows? ... 
Q. So you had a suspicion he had committed or [was] about to commit a 
crime, but you don't know what crime? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, it could have been anything, reckless driving to terrorism? 
A. Could be. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4 (emphasis added).) 
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contrary, this minimal evidence does not directly contradict [the defendants'] explanation 
for the fire and does not implicate any specific criminal activity." Bunting, 142 Idaho at 
915. This holding is equally applicable to Mr. Petersen's case: he provided an 
explanation for all the facts that the officers were concerned about, and although they 
could potentially be viewed in a suspicious light, did not implicate any specific criminal 
activity. As such, this decision is also clearly contradictory to the Court of Appeals' own 
precedent. Therefore, this Court should exercise its review authority in this case. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case demonstrates the latest 
step in a disturbing trend where the Court of Appeals has moved toward allowing 
warrantless searches based solely on the officer's testimony that he was suspicious. 
Compare State v. Schwartz, 133 Idaho 463, 467 (1999) (holding that the test is an 
objective one; the officer's subjective belief as to whether he had probable cause is not 
relevant). The Opinion in this case was issued a few weeks after the Court of Appeals' 
opinion in State v. Mathews, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 754 (Ct. App. Nov. 19, 
2013). 15 The facts upon which the officers relied in that case to formulate the basis for 
their "probable cause" mirror those relied upon in this case, though on the opposite end 
of the spectrum. 16 In Mathews, the suspicious factors were the suspect's calm 
15 Given the similarity of the facts at issue, as well as the irreconcilable nature of the 
Court of Appeals' analysis in each case, Mr. Petersen and Mr. Mathews filed a joint 
motion to consolidate their cases for purposes of review. (Motion to Consolidate and to 
Suspsend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed December 17, 
2013.) This Court denied that motion without explanation. (Order Denying Motion to 
Consolidate Appeals and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated January 15, 2014.) 
16 In both cases, the Court of Appeals decided that certain factors articulated by the 
officers added no weight to the determination of probable cause and so did not consider 
them. In Mr. Petersen's case, it was the presence of sodas and jeans in his car. 
(Opinion, p.8 n.3.) In Mathews, it was the presence of energy drinks and food 
wrappers. Mathews, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 754, p.5. The fact that the officers 
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demeanor and eye contact with the officer, his circuitous travel route, and his lack of an 
explanation for his travel plans. Id. pp.5-7. In this case, the suspicious factors were 
Mr. Petersen's nervous behavior and his explanation of his travel plans along a direct 
travel route (going to buy a motor home with cash, per his personal preference for such 
transactions, given his career in used car sales, and to visit a friend in Seattle). 
(Opinion, pp.8-9.) In both cases, those facts were sufficient, according to the Court 
of Appeals, to give rise to probable cause, so as to justify warrantless search of 
Mr. Petersen's vehicle, or to give rise to reasonable suspicion, so as to justify the 
prolonged detention in Mathews. 
The result of the Court of Appeals' recent decisions is that, no matter how a 
person travels on Idaho's roads or interacts with its law enforcement officers, that 
person is behaving suspiciously and the officers can disregard that person's 
constitutional rights and warrantlessly search his car. For example, if he is nervous, 
that is suspicious behavior, but if he is not nervous, that is also suspicious. Compare 
Mathews, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 754, 5-7; with Petersen, 2013 Opinion No. 
775, 8-9. If he takes the interstate directly toward his destination, that is suspicious, 
while, if he chooses to travel Idaho's scenic highways, that is also suspicious, because 
in either case, he might possibly be part of a drug operation. Id. Such holdings allow 
the exception to swallow the rule, and is directly contrary to clear and unanimous United 
States Supreme Court precedent: "it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
were relying in part on such "minimally-relevant" factors further demonstrates that the 
officers did not have a particularized suspicion, but rather, were trying to justify a search 
based on a hunch. 
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically 
established and exceptions."' Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals' 
decision does not promote application of a "well-delineated" exception; it broadens the 
exception to effectively all traffic stops. As such, it promotes a presumption that the 
warrantless search is reasonable, rather than adhering to the rule that such a 
warrantless intrusion is per se unreasonable. Since the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in 
direct conflict with the controlling precedent, this Court should grant review in this case 
to remedy that error. 
11. 
The District Court's Order Suppressing The Evidence Should Be Affirmed Because The 
Officers Engaged In An Illegal Search Of Mr. Petersen's Car 
A. Introduction 
The district court properly found that the officers lacked probable cause to 
conduct a search of Mr. Petersen's car pursuant to the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement. The information the officers highlighted did no more than give 
them, by their own admission, an unparticularized hunch. Warrantless invasions of 
privacy are not permitted when officers merely have hunches of criminal activity. 
Alternatively, this Court should affirm the district court's decision because the 
officers impermissibly extended the detention, as no reasonable person would have felt 
free to leave when, after turning to leave, has an officer reengage him in a conversation 
and that officer is repeating the same questions that he has already answered, 
particularly when he is on the side of an interstate highway, close enough to the lane of 
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travel to raise safety concerns, and the emergency lights on the officer's vehicle are still 
activated. 17 
B. The District Court Properly Suppressed The Evidence Found In The Passenger 
Compartment Of Mr. Petersen's Car When It Determined That The Officers' 
Search Of That Car Was Not Justified By The Automobile Exception Because 
The Officers Did Not Have Probable Cause To Suspect Any Criminal Activity 
The State argues that the district court's finding that the automobile exception did 
not justify the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's 
vehicle was in error because it believes the officers had probable cause from the 
"criminal indicators" identified by the officers, when considered alongside the cash found 
in the trunk. (App. Br., pp.5-9.) The State is mistaken because those factors do not 
constitute probable cause; at best, they give rise to a hunch. 
In Bunting, the only evidence that could properly be considered in assessing 
whether there was probable cause for a search was not sufficiently particularized to 
justify the search. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 386. That was because the information 
considered was all of a non-criminal nature and, even though that information "could be 
viewed in a suspicious light," it did not reasonably demonstrate the probability of any 
particular crime would be found during a subsequent search. See id.; Newman, 149 
Idaho at 600. Therefore, where facts articulated by officers do not reasonably suggest 
17 If this Court affirms the decision to suppress the fruit of the illegal search on the 
alternative ground, then the officers' search of the trunk of Mr. Petersen's car 
constituted a warrantless search without a justifying exception present. As a result, the 
cash should also be suppressed, and thus, could not be considered in the totality of 
circumstances to determine whether probable cause existed for the search of the 
passenger compartment. That would leave only the "criminal indicators" to be weighed 
in that regard, and they only generate a hunch at most. Therefore, the district court's 
order to suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's 
car should be affirmed on this alternative ground. Athay, 146 Idaho at 415; Curl, 125 
Idaho at 227. 
20 
any particular criminal activity is afoot, especially where all the facts articulated are not 
criminal in nature, they do not form a particularized suspicion of criminal activity upon 
which to justify a probable cause search. See id. 
The facts known to the officers in regard to Mr. Petersen do not reasonably 
suggest that any particular criminal activity was afoot. In fact, Officer Gorham admitted 
that, based on the facts of which he was aware before the money in the trunk was 
discovered, he did not have a suspicion that any particular criminal activity was afoot: 
Q. What were you investigating [when you called Mr. Petersen back after 
telling him he was free to leave]? 
A. Potential crime. 
Q. What crime? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What crime did you reasonably suppose he was engaged in? 
A. I'm not sure. That's why I asked for consent to search the vehicle to 
find possible evidence of that crime. And criminal indicators could be any 
crime throughout the spectrum. People are going to show indicators, 
whether they are murderers, whether they had child porn inside the 
vehicle, drugs, money. Who knows? ... 
Q. So you had a suspicion he had committed or [was] about to commit a 
crime, but you don't know what crime? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So, it could have been anything, reckless driving to terrorism? 
A. Could be. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4 (emphasis added).) And even after the money was 
discovered, all Officer Gorham could say was: 
A. We believed we had a crime occurring in our presence. 
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Q. And that would be the fact he was in possession of the cash or was it 
something else? 
A. The only charge would be it was the crime I believe he was in commission of 
[sic]. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.64, Ls.13-18.) With those answers, Officer Gorham admitted that he only 
had a hunch of criminal activity, and that his hunch was not particularized in any way, 
which means the officers could not have had the necessary probable cause to 
search the vehicle. Compare Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915; Newman, 149 Idaho at 600; 
see also State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2008) (discussing officers' hunches and 
the impropriety of basing searches thereon). Given the non-criminal nature of the items 
observed in Mr. Petersen's car, and the low degree of suspicion that those items 
generated as a whole, even in the officer's own mind, a reasonable person would not 
see probable cause in the totality of these circumstances. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 
915. 
Apart from those factors, which could not reasonably generate an articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity, there was only one other fact known to Officer Moffett 
when he began his search: there was money in the trunk. That too, was a fact of a 
non-criminal nature, and was not particularly suspicious. (See R., pp.218-19.) 
Furthermore, Mr. Petersen gave the officers a plausible explanation for legitimately 
carrying that amount of cash: he was planning on purchasing a motor home, and, given 
his history as a car salesman, he preferred to make such transactions in cash. 
(R., p.219.) Therefore, the district court found the fact that Mr. Petersen had a 
legitimate explanation for having the money in his car gave that money a low degree of 
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suspiciousness as well, and it determined that, even considering it alongside the other 
factors, they were not of a significant weight, and therefore, did not give rise to probable 
cause. (R., pp.218-219.) As such, given the non-criminal nature and low degree of 
suspicion attached to all the factors identified by the officers, this Court should affirm the 
district court's decision to suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment 
as the fruit of an illegal search. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915. 
C. The District Court's Order Suppressing The Evidence Should Also Be Affirmed 
Because The Officers lmpermissibly Extended The Duration Of The Stop 
Even if this Court would tend to agree with the State that the "criminal indicators" 
combined with the money could generate probable cause, it should still affirm the district 
court's suppression order on other grounds. '"Where an order of the lower court is 
correct, but based on an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct 
theory."' Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 415 (2008) (quoting Andre v. Morrow, 106 
Idaho 455, 459 (1984)); see, e.g., State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 227 (1993) (applying 
this rule while affirming the lower court's order to suppress evidence found during an 
illegal search). This Court should affirm the order suppressing the evidence found 
during the search of Mr. Petersen's vehicle because the officers unreasonably 
prolonged their detention of Mr. Petersen. See, e.g., Curl, 125 Idaho at 227. The 
district court determined that the officers did improperly prolong the stop. (R., p.211.) 
However, it determined that did not justify suppressing the evidence found in the car 
because it also determined that the stop had evolved into a consensual encounter, and 
therefore, denied Mr. Petersen's motion on that ground. (R., p.211.) Mr. Petersen 
contends the district court's conclusion was erroneous, and that the district court's order 
suppressing the evidence should be upheld because the stop was illegally prolonged. 
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When officers effectuate a traffic stop, the detention of the driver must be based 
on reasonable suspicion and "must also be reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 
59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The duration of a traffic stop cannot be extended once the purpose 
of the stop is completed. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002). It is 
clear that, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after 
the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, no matter how short, extends 
the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy and liberty of 
the vehicle's occupants." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). There are 
two exceptions to this rule. First, if the officer observes objective, specific, and 
particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the purpose 
of the stop may evolve, allowing the otherwise impermissible extended detention and 
investigation. See, e.g., State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (Ct. App. 2001). 
A mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion on the part of the officer is insufficient to 
trigger this exception. See Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64. Otherwise, the encounter may 
evolve into a consensual encounter, but such evolution only occurs when an officer 
returns the driver's identification and there is no "further show of authority which would 
convey a message that the individual is not free to leave." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. 
If the encounter does not become consensual and the officer prolongs the detention, the 
officer violates the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.; Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8. 
In this case, as described in Section ll(B), supra, the officers had not observed 
objective, specific, and particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of any 
specific criminal activity. ( See, e.g., R., p.211.) Rather, all they had at the point Officer 
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Gorham gave Mr. Petersen the warning citation, and thereby completed the purpose of 
the stop, was a hunch that criminal activity was afoot - they did not suspect any 
particular criminal activity based on their observations. (R., p.211.) Therefore, because 
there were no objective particularized facts to justify a shift in the investigation, the 
officer's questions about an issue unrelated to the purpose of the stop, after the purpose 
of the stop was completed, extended the stop without justification.18 See Brumfield, 136 
Idaho at 916; Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64. Furthermore, Officer Gorham admitted that he 
was continuing his investigation when he asked Mr. Petersen the additional questions 
after giving him the warning citation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.51, Ls.5-9.) Therefore, Officer 
Gorham improperly extended the duration of the stop. See, e.g., Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 
at 8; Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. As such, the only way that Officer Gorham's 
investigation did not violate Mr. Petersen's constitutional right to be free from 
warrantless seizures is if the encounter became consensual. 
The encounter between Mr. Petersen and the officers did not become 
consensual because Officer Gorham made a further show of authority when, as 
Mr. Petersen attempted to leave, Officer Gorham reinitiated contact with Mr. Petersen 
so as to ask him questions which Mr. Petersen had already answered. That conveyed 
the message that Mr. Petersen was not, in fact, free to leave after all. Gutierrez, 137 
Idaho at 650. The ultimate conclusion of whether Mr. Petersen was free to leave is not 
based on what the officer subjectively intended to do (i.e., engage in a consensual 
conversation), but rather, is based on how an objectively reasonable person would feel, 
18 The district court actually concluded that, unless the stop had evolved into a 
consensual encounter, then the officers would have improperly prolonged the stop. 
(R., p.211.) 
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based on that reasonable person's interpretation of the officer's statements and actions. 
See, e.g., id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (holding that a 
seizure occurs when the reasonable person would not feel free '"to disregard the police 
and go about his business"') (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)). 
As with the officer's subjective beliefs, the defendant's subjective beliefs about whether 
he was free to go are not relevant; the courts must determine if a reasonable person 
would feel free to leave. State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App. 2011). 
However, it is noteworthy that Officer Gorham admitted the only reason he asked 
Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go" was to attempt to get around the legal requirement 
that he not extend traffic stops without particularized suspicion. ( See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, 
p.10, Ls.15-16; Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) He never actually told Mr. Petersen that he could 
leave. 19 (See generally R., Trs.) Officer Gorham stated that, as Mr. Petersen started to 
head back to his vehicle, "I started up a consensual conversation with him, a couple 
more questions I wanted to ask him and if he wanted to stick around and answer them, 
I would like to talk to him." (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.14-17 (emphasis added).) He claimed 
that the reason he reinitiated the interrogation was "[m]y reasonable suspicion was 
starting to pique. So as an officer, it was my duty to ... confront him or deny my 
suspicion. I asked him a couple of additional question is [sic] one of those ways to do 
that." (Tr., Vol.2, p.46, Ls.4-9.) However, Officer Gorham admitted that "nothing 
19 Officer Gorham testified at the preliminary hearing: "I asked [Mr. Petersen] if he was 
good to go, in which [sic] he told me he was." (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.15-16.) That was 
consistent with his police report. (R., p.20.) However, at the hearing on Mr. Petersen's 
motions, he testified: "I told him he was good to go." (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) The 
district court resolved this contradiction, finding, as a matter of fact, that Officer Gorham 
"asked Defendant if he was 'good to go."' (R., p.202 (emphasis added).) Idaho's 
appellate courts defer to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232 (2005). 
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increased my suspicion," as nothing about the encounter had changed. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.47, L.20 - p.49, L.11.) Therefore, a reasonable person, who may have assumed he 
was free to leave, would be disabused of that belief by the officer's decision to reinitiate 
contact and ask the same questions he had already asked within seconds of an attempt 
to leave the scene. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.1-11.) As such, the reasonable person 
would interpret the officer's reinitiation of the encounter as a show of authority that 
would convey the message to a reasonable person that Mr. Petersen was not, in fact, 
free to leave. See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. Given the totality of the circumstances, 
a reasonable person would not have felt free to get in his car and drive away from 
Officer Gorham, and so, despite his attempt to circumvent Mr. Petersen's constitutional 
rights, he illegally prolonged the detention of Mr. Petersen. 
Additionally, when a person is ordered out of their vehicle pursuant to 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 160, 111 n.6 (1977), it is likely that they "would not 
believe that the traffic stop was over until he or she was permitted to return [to their 
car]." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651. In this case, Officer Gorham only asked if 
Mr. Petersen was good to go; he never actually told Mr. Petersen that he was free to 
leave. And while Mr. Petersen may have initially interpreted that question as permission 
to return to his car (evidenced by his turning to head toward the car), he was 
immediately disabused of that belief when Officer Gorham spoke up after just a few 
seconds (Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.5-11), indicating that Mr. Petersen should wait because he 
had more questions to ask. In such situations, this Court has determined that "[t]he 
average person may not have felt comfortable driving away at that point, knowing that 
the officer wanted to say something." State v. Ray, 153 Idaho 564, 568 (2012). 
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Therefore, a reasonable person in Mr. Petersen's situation would not have felt free to 
leave, and thus, the conversation was not consensual. See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 
650. 
Furthermore, this encounter was taking place on the side of an interstate 
highway and the parked cars were close enough to the lanes of travel to give both 
officers some concern as to their safety from other vehicles on the road. (See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.2, p.60, L.19 - p.61, L.5 (Officer Gorham describing his concern).) In fact, 
according to Officer Moffett, "it's a very tight roadway through there and it would be [a] 
safety issue for us to turn ou[r] lights off."20 (Tr., Vol.1, p.65, Ls.16-19.) As such, that 
particular shoulder of the highway was not a safe place where reasonable people would 
stand around and converse. A reasonable person would not remain in such a situation 
any longer than need be. Therefore, when Officer Gorham told Mr. Petersen that he 
had more questions, a reasonable person would not believe Mr. Petersen remained in 
that vulnerable location on the side of the interstate highway of his own volition; a 
reasonable person would believe that Officer Gorham was detaining Mr. Petersen in 
that situation. 
That determination - that a reasonable person, who is notified by a police officer, 
while they are standing in a vulnerable location on the side of an interstate highway, that 
the officer has more questions to ask, would not feel free to leave - is even more 
20 Again, Officer Gorham offered some contradictory testimony in regard to whether the 
lights remained on during the encounter, although he ultimately admitted he could not 
actually remember whether the lights were on or off during the encounter. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.50, Ls.3-24.) The district court resolved that factual issue, finding, as a matter of fact, 
that the emergency lights remained on throughout the encounter. (R., p.217.) As that 
finding was based on substantial evidence in the record, this Court should defer to it. 
See Watts, 142 Idaho at 232. 
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reasonable where the police vehicle's emergency lights remain activated. See, e.g., 
State v. Mireless, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1992). This Court has held that, in such 
situations, "[f]ew, if any reasonable citizens, while parked, would simply drive away and 
assume that the police, in turning on the emergency flashers, would be communicating 
something other than for them to remain." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 487 
(2009) (quoting Lawson v. State, 707 A.2d 947, 951 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)). As 
such, the fact that the officers left their vehicle's emergency lights activated throughout 
their encounter with Mr. Petersen (R., p.217), further evidences that a reasonable 
person in Mr. Petersen's situation would not have felt free to disregard Officer Gorham 
and drive off, meaning the subsequent interrogation was not consensual. See id.; 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; Ray, 153 Idaho at 568; 
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 487. 
Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances in this case an ordinary person 
would not feel free to simply disregard the officer and leave, regardless of how the 
officer intended the situation to play out. Ray, 153 Idaho at 568; Willoughby, 147 Idaho 
at 487; Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651; Mireless, 133 Idaho at 692. As such, the 
conversation between the officers and Mr. Petersen, after they returned his identification 
and completed the purpose of the traffic stop, was not consensual, and as a result, 
Officer Gorham illegally extended the detention. Compare Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650-
53. 
As a result, the only evidence that could properly be considered in assessing 
whether there was probable cause to search the passenger compartment of 
Mr. Petersen's car were those facts known to the officers before they illegally 
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extended the duration of the stop (i.e., the supposed "criminal indicators"). Since those 
facts would only give rise to a hunch (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4), they 
did not give rise to the necessary probable cause to justify the search of the passenger 
compartment under the automobile exception. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 805; Anderson, 
154 Idaho at 706. Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's order 
suppressing the evidence on this alternative theory. See Athay, 146 Idaho at 415; Curl, 
125 Idaho at 227. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Petersen respectfully requests that this Court exercise its review authority in 
this case. On review, he requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision to 
suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's car. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014. 
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